

## DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HISTORICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

### -Proceedings-

26 October 2006

In attendance at all or part of the open meeting of the Department of the Army Advisory Committee (DAHAC) were the following personnel:

**Dr. Jeffrey J. Clarke**, Director, Center of Military History  
**Dr. Richard W. Stewart**, Chief Historian, Center of Military History (Executive Secretary, DAHAC)  
**Professor Jon T. Sumida**, University of Maryland, College Park (DAHAC, Chairman)  
**Professor Adrian R. Lewis**, University of North Texas (DAHAC)  
**Professor Brian M. Linn**, Texas A&M University (DAHAC)  
**Professor Ronald H. Spector**, George Washington University (DAHAC)  
**Professor Reina Pennington**, Norwich University - 805  
**Dr. James J. Carafano**, The Heritage Foundation (DAHAC)  
**Professor Theodore A. Wilson**, University of Kansas (DAHAC)  
**COL Lance Betros** (representing BG Patrick Finnegan, U.S. Military Academy), Department of History (DAHAC)  
**COL Robert Dalessandro** (representing COL Thomas Torrance, Army War College), Army Heritage and Education Center (DAHAC)  
**Mr. Steven A. Raho** (representing Ms. Joyce Morrow, Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army), Records Management and Declassification Agency (DAHAC)  
**Dr. William G. Robertson**, U.S. Army Combat Studies, TRADOC  
**Dr. James H. Willbanks** (representing BG Mark O'Neill, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College), Department of Military History, CGSC  
**Mr. Paul Wester** representing Mr. Howard Lowell, National Archives and Records Administration, NARA (DAHAC)  
**Dr. J. Britt McCarley** (representing LTG Thomas Metz, TRADOC), U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (DAHAC)  
**Mr. R. Cody Phillips**, Staff Curator, Center of Military History (Recorder, DAHAC)  
**Dr. John Shortal**, Assistant Chief of Military History, Center of Military History  
**COL John Spinelli**, Deputy Director, Center of Military History  
**COL Gary Bowman**, Deputy Commander (IMA), Center of Military History  
**MAJ James McDonnell**, Executive Officer, Center of Military History  
**Dr. Joel Meyerson**, Acting Chief, Histories Division, Center of Military History  
**Dr. Richard Davis**, Chief, Field Programs and Historical Services Division, Center of Military History  
**Mr. Keith Tidman**, Chief, Publishing Division, Center of Military History  
**Mr. Terry Dougherty**, Acting Chief, Museum Division, Center of Military History  
**Mr. Judson E. Bennett**, Director, National Museum of the United States Army, Center of Military History  
**Dr. Charles Cureton**, Historical Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

The session formally began at 8:33 a.m. with Dr. Stewart introducing new attendees and making some administrative announcements. [A list of members attending is at Tab A. Attached at Tab B is the meeting schedule/agenda.]



**Clarke:** (Introductory remarks, and introduced Dr. Shortal, COL Spinelli, and MAJ McDonnell.) The MHCC [Military History Coordinating Committee] met yesterday, as we usually do this time each year. Attending that session were representatives from the U.S. Military Academy, Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, Military History Department at CGSC [Command and General Staff College], and AHEC [Army Heritage and Education Center]. It was a productive meeting. We discussed a new strategic plan for the Center and the Army Historical Program. This will give you an idea of where we are and where we were. [Dr. Clarke distributed the current strategic plans for CMH and the Army Historical Program; see Tabs C and D respectively.] Shortly after starting as the Center's new Chief Historian about fifteen years ago, I drafted what I thought we could consider for a formal ten-year strategic plan [Tab E]. Obviously, conditions have changed significantly since this was done, but I thought it might interest you to see where I thought we were headed several years ago and compare it to where we are today.

For the MHCC, I envision expanding both its role and its membership—or participants. In the future, I think we would have various working groups, represented by historians in different areas, plus curators and archivists in the fields that affect them. At the minimum, we would probably have three "working groups": products and services, records and archives, and program administration. [See Tab F] These working groups would contribute to the development of the Center's new strategic plan, as well as some of the future operations of CMH.

As a minimum, the new CMH strategic plan should address three principal components. The first will be our Army museums—specifically the management of the field museums and NMUSA [National Museum of the United States Army]. With the acquisition of the FORSCOM museums, and you will hear more about that shortly, and other initiatives coming, we can anticipate major changes in existing Army regulations and how we do business, particularly in the museum community. I believe we will need some working committees to develop some of the procedures affecting the field museums. A second component will be to push our product within the Army. We don't always succeed in getting the word out to our primary audience. I know that our products are being used to support education, decision-making, and operations, but I think we could do better. A third aspect of our new strategic plan will focus on information technology. I don't think we are using it as effectively as we should. And in this day, we must capitalize on this important tool. These are the three key areas that CMH must address in its next strategic plan. [See Tab G]

We'll need two plans: one CMH, and one for the Army Historical Program. We're definitely looking at expanding the MHCC, which would include its role, participants, and frequency of meeting. At the last MHCC, we talked about coordination of operations: who had the lead for what. We also considered the DAHAC and talked about the possibility of shifting its focus. A new personnel system is to be implemented, probably in 2007. And of course, we have many museum issues on the horizon.

Well, that's where we are with the MHCC and strategic planning for the Center. I wanted to bring you up to date on these things before we went too far in our deliberations today.

**Sumida:** Last year, we opened our meeting with a wide-ranging scope of issues. I think that was fruitful, but many of our topics were complex, which forced some compression on things that were discussed late in the day. So this year, I want to begin by reviewing our charter. As I see it, we have essentially three responsibilities. We advise the Army concerning professional standards. We promote cooperation with the academic



community. And we further the study of military history in the Army and in schools. A rising issue, I think, is quality control in the field of history—especially with the policies and the teaching of military history in Army schools. I would like you to think about all this, and we can discuss it later today or this evening at dinner. But right now, let's turn to our current agenda.

**Stewart:** We're a little ahead of schedule. Mr. Raho, would you like to lead-off with Army records management?

**Raho:** I have no formal presentation. Drawing on what was discussed last year, I can tell you that our contingency operations records are still quite small—but we're working on a fix for that. Our major initiative is to have an inter-agency review of classified records to ensure consistency and timeliness. You see, what's happening now is that each agency—and many subordinate agencies too—review their records for declassification and disposition. That's fine for agency-specific material. But in this joint environment, we have records that cross over to other agencies. So, one agency may review material sooner or later than another agency may review the same material. This creates an uneven disposition and declassification of some records. We're trying to orchestrate a systemic solution.

**Unknown:** Is this a DOD initiative?

**Raho:** No. This is an Army initiative. Army has the lead. We're trying to pull everyone together to resolve this problem.

**Clarke:** Are you under the AA [Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army] or ACSIM [Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management]?

**Raho:** We're still under the AA, where I think we'll be for awhile.

**Clarke:** How does the Rand Corporation fit in all this, especially with the funding they receive from the G-3?

**Raho:** The G-3 has the funds. We don't. Obviously, there's no centralized control over the acquisition and disposition of Army records. Let's face it, the only real effective way of saving records is to go eyeball-to-eyeball to get them. The policies are in place, and we have a program. Most of that is under my wing. But the only way to make all of it work is to physically gather the data. So you use the resources that work—the resources that are available. That means contractors or the G-3.

**Carafano:** We had the same problem in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. If the records weren't collected by whoever took the initiative to secure them, they simply disappeared. It sounds like we haven't learned our lessons yet.

**Clarke:** The elimination of administrative personnel in units and many related MOSS [military occupational specialties] has hurt the effort too.

**McCarley:** If we're saying that it's a unit task to save these records for the Army's history, then we ought to have the FORSCOM Historian here. He's the one who could help get the word out.

**Carafano:** I think that's only a small part of the solution. The Army should institutionalize the records management and collection process.

**Stewart:** It's not just small units. The bigger problem is higher up. We have to get this to the joint headquarters.

**Raho:** You're right, but we can't seem to get through to them. The other services don't always listen to us. However, we can deal with Army personnel—and we do get some favorable responses from them. Our problems are that the training for Army personnel is incomplete, the responses are uneven, and the records themselves are either incomplete or non-existent. We know we are losing material simply because soldiers don't know what to save or where to send it (some probably don't take the time to think it through).

**Betros:** Does any of this appear in joint doctrine, specifically, its literature?

**Raho:** No. The Army has it spelled-out in its regulations, not in field manuals. And you won't find anything in print in a joint headquarters.

**Carafano:** Why not write a book about this?

**Pennington:** As an institutional history, I think it's a great idea. "Losing History": it's a topic that merits visibility and study.

**Carafano:** I agree. That's the way to highlight the complexity and depth of the problem. Talking about it amongst ourselves is one thing, but putting it into print for Army—and public—consumption ensures that someone is going to be aware of what we are dealing with and that there is a problem that demands resolution.

[Multiple conversations followed, which generally focused on the issue of Army records. These conversations concluded when Dr. Stewart introduced Mr. Matthew Stafford of the Rand Corporation.]

**Stafford:** [Power Point Briefing. See Tab H.]

**Clarke:** Are you funded by the Army G-3?

**Stafford:** No. This is an Army G-8 funded project.

[A general discussion followed concerning the accessibility of the data that the Rand Corporation is documenting. The principal participants included: **Raho, Sumida, Dalessandro, Stewart, Wilson, Clarke, and Pennington.**]

The DAHAC recessed at 10:15 a.m. The meeting resumed at 10:27 a.m.

**Dalessandro:** [Summary of MHCC Briefing. See Tab I.] The AHEC [Army Heritage and Education Center] is now an official part of the National Army Museum project. Currently, we have a backlog in cataloging of nine million archival items. We're working on this, and we anticipate funding for our visitor center coming soon. We've had a significant increase in visitors and researchers in the past year. Our challenge now is to generate a reliable funding stream for our operations.



We're also looking into getting the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC) with joint personnel records to move to Carlisle. The Pennsylvania congressional delegation scrambled and offered free land for such a project. We have the space—and I think the ability—to provide a one-stop Army facility to serve as a holding area for Army records. The other services, particularly the Navy, have gotten wind of what we are exploring, and they've indicated a desire to piggyback on our initiative. So this may become something bigger than just an Army operation. The joint staff has all this data, and the Army is studying this option as well.

**Raho:** The Army uses about fifteen records centers that maintain material before being retired to NARA [National Archives and Records Administration]. Colonel Dalessandro is talking about creating something for the economy and convenience of the Army: instead of dealing with fifteen different locations, we would have a one-stop place at Carlisle Barracks. Now Department of Defense is joining in those deliberations and thinking in the same direction.

**Dalessandro:** I don't see AHEC being the manager of this new records center at Carlisle. More likely, RMDA [Records Management and Declassification Agency] would be the driver.

**Raho:** Money and convenience are what is pushing this proposal. It doesn't eliminate NARA. Ultimately, we're talking about records that eventually would pass to NARA. The site at Carlisle would merely be an intermediate holding before a permanent disposition of the records occurs, which we already have at fifteen sites.

**Dalessandro:** All the services—except the Marine Corps—are receptive to this proposal.

**Wester:** NARA has some reservations about how this would affect the long-term preservation and accessibility of these records.

**Dalessandro:** We're really not trying to become the next National Personnel Records Center. I see this as just a short-term solution for collecting personnel records until they are ultimately retired to NARA.

[A general discussion followed about the concept of creating a joint personnel records center at Carlisle Barracks and other initiatives affecting AHEC. The principal participants included: **Clarke, Dalessandro, Carafano, and Wilson.**]

**Davis:** Where is CMH on your map?

**Dalessandro:** In the long-term, that may happen, with the Center of Military History moving to Carlisle Barracks. Let's face it: if most Army history operations are there, it follows that the Center of Military History should be too. AHEC would become part of CMH. Why not? AHEC no longer is under the Army War College, and we're gradually falling under the CMH orbit already. We're pretty well entrenched at Carlisle. If these other initiatives unfold, I think CMH would want to be there as well.

**Stewart:** But isn't it also possible that AHEC should or could go back to the War College?

**Dalessandro:** That's a possibility, but the War College isn't looking at that right now.

**Sumida:** This is a big deal: moving the Center to Carlisle Barracks.

**Clarke:** We can talk about it, but I don't see this ever happening.

**Linn:** So you're really not representing the War College; you're only representing AHEC. Why is there no representation here from the Army War College, especially the teaching faculty?

**Dalessandro:** It's a lack of interest. They really don't want to play. Command support for history is uneven and varies from year to year. There is a lot of individual involvement and support, but very little institutional presence. For example, the Johnson Visiting Chair simply went away. There was no interest from the Army War College to sustain it, and no funding from TRADOC [U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command] was forthcoming. If the college would not push it, TRADOC was not going to fund it.

[A general discussion followed concerning history courses and instruction offered at the Army War College. The principal participants included: **Carafano, Dalessandro, Sumida, Pennington, Wilson, and Linn.**]

**Linn:** Look at the Army War College report in the draft *Army Historical Program* report for Fiscal Year 2007. There is absolutely no indication that any core history is being taught at the college. It looks to me that what little is being done is "touchy-feely" stuff. We can't tell what is being taught, and it's not clear from what was submitted is hours or minutes.

**Lewis:** This seems to go back to your first point: What history instruction is actually being provided at the college—and for that matter, other Army schools as well?

**Wilson:** Perhaps this is a reflection of the culture. Maybe the war college perceives that history is not important enough to be taught separately, because the Army leadership believes that too.

[There were multiple conversations that seemed to deal with various aspects of history instruction at service schools and the Army War College in particular.]

**Sumida:** I could "express our concern" about the quantity and quality of instruction in history at the Army War College. I could do this with the DAS [Director of the Army Staff] tomorrow and in our written report to the Secretary of the Army. But I doubt we know enough to go beyond that right now. We really don't know enough to be more specific.

**Clarke:** What does the National War College do?

**Stewart:** The National War College does not have a history department, but it has a strong strategic studies department, which has a heavy history content. I think their specific curriculum has been revised since I attended, so I can't comment on its content now.

[A general discussion followed concerning the quality of history instruction and its possible impact on accreditation at the Army War College. The consensus was that this



was a topic that should be addressed by the college's Board of Visitors, and that a sub-committee of the DAHAC should visit the Army War College in the future—as was done in 2005 at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. The principal participants included: **Lewis, Sumida, Linn, and Raho.**]

**Sumida:** Is the issue of CMH going to Carlisle Barracks worth discussing this year?

**Clarke:** No. This is not something that is being seriously considered by anyone around here or at the Pentagon. I really do not believe it would happen.

The DAHAC recessed at 11:32 a.m., and resumed at 11:50 a.m.

The meeting resumed with Colonel Dalessandro introducing two curators from the Army Heritage Museum, who discussed the mission and objectives of the facility and showed objects from its collection.

**Linn:** I know you've done a survey of Vietnam War veterans. Have you done one for the Cold War?

**Dalessandro:** Yes, the Vietnam survey is out, and that's probably what has caused a recent spike in Vietnam veterans contacting us. The Cold War survey should pick-up momentum next month.

[A general discussion followed concerning collecting practices for the Army Heritage Museum and veteran surveys. The principal participants included: **Linn, Pennington, Dalessandro, and Lewis.**]

The DAHAC recessed at 12:15 p.m., and resumed at 12:29 p.m.

**Bennett:** [Power Point Briefing, paper copy not available.] We hit a major problem on 26 January of this year when the Executive Steering Committee at the Pentagon expressed its reservations about the site for the National Museum. They did not like the location, which was on the North Post of Fort Belvoir, and they referred the site selection question to BRAC [Base Realignment and Closure] for resolution. This put us in the mix for many other competing agencies for space on the post. So the two key issues that are facing us today are cost and location. We sunk a lot of money into the site study, and now that is not recoverable—plus, we have the lost planning time too.

**Sumida:** How much has been lost from all these site studies and lost sites?

**Bennett:** About six to seven million dollars. Total.

**Linn:** How much will the building cost?

**Bennett:** Well, that will be private money. The Army is paying for the site studies, staff, and environmental impact assessments. The actual construction will come from private sources. The costs vary, depending upon what site is selected. It could be as low as 100 million dollars—maybe even lower—or as high as 150 million dollars. It all depends on where the final site will be.

**Sumida:** Maybe we should say something about this in our report?

**Bennett:** I appreciate that sir, and whatever you say would be helpful, but let me cover a few more points first. BRAC is now a major player in the site selection decision. With BRAC on the horizon, we're talking about moving 30,000 to 40,000 additional personnel to Fort Belvoir. That's a lot of office space and new construction. Funding strategies also are affecting this program. Over the past five years, we've seen a steady rise in projected construction costs for the National Museum. Each delay pushes the price up, which increases the burden on the foundation to raise more money. So we're looking at some alternate funding options, perhaps creating multi-purpose sites and forming partnerships with other businesses to offset the expenses and lock-in a site. Currently, we're looking at a promising area on the western side of Engineer Proving Ground off of Interstate 95.

**Clarke:** Let me underscore that the Army leadership is committed to this project. Management of the National Museum project will temporarily move from CMH to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment. The ASA has the political clout to orchestrate this project and keep it in front of the leadership. I think you're going to see some major decisions affecting the National Museum of the United States Army, its funding, and its site coming in the next fiscal year.

**Bennett:** My guess is that no site specific work will be done before November of next year.

**Sumida:** It seems to me that the entire project is stalled.

**Bennett:** Yes, it's stalled.

**Sumida:** Then it sounds like we ought to express our disappointment.

**Bennett:** That would be appropriate, but remember that there is an obligatory timeline we must follow. Perhaps it might be more helpful if the DAHAC revalidated the entire project and expressed its continued support for it.

[There were multiple conversations concerning NMUSA and DAHAC's position about the project.]

**Dalessandro:** Maybe it's simply time we raise the issue point-blank for the Army leadership: it's time to fish or cut bait.

**Sumida:** Well, I'm not certain that we want to put NMUSA on the table or run the risk of permanently hurting the project. The issue, it seems to me, is commitment and cost. The Army leadership must demonstrate the commitment to this project by making firm decisions, and we cannot keep on spending money that goes nowhere.

**McCarley:** I should think that someone already has thought of these questions and answered them: How many millions of dollars have been spent on NMUSA, and has one spade of dirt been turned? Can you prove that there would be a return on the investment for this project? If these questions already have been asked, then it would explain why the project continues to lumber along.



[Multiple conversations followed, which focused on the future of NMUSA and the position that the DAHAC should take. The principal participants included: **Clarke, Sumida, Bennett, Pennington, Cureton, Linn, and Lewis.**]

**Sumida:** We need to move along, and I understand that the Center's new deputy, Colonel Bowman, is here to share his recent observations and experiences of MHDs [military history detachments] in Afghanistan.

**Clarke:** (Introduced COL Bowman as the CMH Deputy Commander and one of three reservists assigned to the Center.)

**Bowman:** (Summarized his background and efforts to get to Afghanistan.) There were several lessons to be learned about the MHDs in theater, but four in particular stand-out. First, the MHD is centrally located at a four-star headquarters. This restricts movement for the MHD and colors its perspective of operations. What is happening at the lower echelons is not what is being seen or reported higher up. Frankly, an MHD at this level is not much more effective than if it were back here in the States. Second, the MHDs focus only on the Army. They have no joint contacts, and definitely no foreign contacts. So, once again, their view of an operation becomes narrowed. Third, there is a clear disconnect between state and federal authority. By that I mean, we have some National Guard MHDs that were doing the best they could, but the material they were collecting and producing was being delivered to their state—not the active Army. There may be more material out there than you realize, but it's at the state archives or National Guard headquarters in states. And finally, I observed some inconsistency over how and what MHDs interpret as historical data. What one MHD may collect as historical data is ignored by another MHD.

**Sumida:** Are you saying that military history detachments are not getting to the field?

**Bowman:** No, I'm saying what I observed. An MHD arrives in theater and is stuck at the headquarters, where it rarely—if ever—gets out of the headquarters and down to lower echelons or units. Part of the problem is the inability of the MHD to cover an entire operation; so it stays where it can have the best view of everything that's going on. Another part of the problem is the inability of an MHD to move to other units. In some cases, civilian journalists have greater freedom of movement—and more support—than an Army historian.

**Wilson:** Are any other national armies doing what we do?

**Bowman:** No. And some seemed even puzzled that we bother.

[A general discussion followed concerning the strengths and limitations of military history detachments. Several points were raised about the limited Army field support for MHDs, which inhibited their ability to accomplish specific missions. The principal participants included: **Davis, Wilson, Raho, Lewis, Bowman, and Linn.**]

**Robertson:** We've had commanders who have rejected military history detachments from their area of operations merely out of fear that something bad would be found. These are exceptions, but they surface periodically.

**Pennington:** These are military personnel on a legitimate mission. The point is: Who can say no?

**Cureton:** The Marines do it differently. We have individuals attached to specific units, so there is some trust and camaraderie established between the unit and the historian. Folks recognize one of their own and will be more cooperative. But the Army depends upon independent MHDs that have not been linked to specific units. So the units have no connectivity to the historical effort. The MHD is a stranger.

**Clarke:** It really boils down to the ability and aggressiveness of an MHD. How hard does the MHD try to get to the troops and develop the historical record. Sometimes these detachments have to volunteer to do more for a command and develop relationships.

**Sumida:** How should we address this?

**Bowman:** Flexibility. I think the Army needs to be flexible in how it collects historical data and interacts with units and commands. Sometimes we need an individual. Sometimes we need a team—like an MHD.

**Carafano:** Your earlier comments about your traveling companions and their difficulties in getting into the theater raise another issue. We have got to coordinate the people we send. CSI [Combat Studies Institute], CALL [Center for Army Lessons Learned], MHDs, and CMH—all of these agencies are going to headquarters collecting similar data, doing similar things. If we coordinated these efforts, I think we could do a better job of ensuring that we retrieve all the data we are seeking.

**Bowman:** I agree wholeheartedly.

**Dalessandro:** You're right. This is a problem that we need to fix. We can do better, and we ought to do so.

**Stewart:** Well, we need to move along, and our Acting Chief of the Museum Division needs to talk to you about the Army Museum System and our pending acquisition of the FORSCOM museums.

**Dougherty:** [Power Point Brief, Tab J.]

The DAHAC recessed at 2:14 p.m., and resumed at 2:31 p.m.

**Stewart:** Continuing with our agenda, our next presenter is Dr. Richard Davis of our Field Programs and Historical Services Division, who will talk about our MHDs and their training.

**Davis:** Our annual training for the military history detachments is going on right now in Georgia. There are no MHDs in Afghanistan right now. We have only two military history detachments in Iraq: one in Casey's headquarters and the other covers everything else. Obviously, we're not getting down to the brigade and battalion level.

**Stewart:** The detachments are spread too thin and too far. For example, we could not do a history of the first Stryker brigade in Iraq easily, because we simply did not have the manpower in-country to do the job. We had to commit more resources in CONUS



[Continental United States] to collect the necessary data. The MHDs simply could not do it.

**Davis:** Keep in mind that in addition to these operational deployments, the history detachments also have their annual training. This is a rigorous two-week training that we support in coordination with the FORSCOM and Army Reserve history offices. The first week is held at Fort McPherson, Georgia, and the second week involves a staff ride at Chattanooga, Tennessee. This training is necessary because of the uneven experience among our personnel in the history detachments. Being assigned to a military history detachment does not mean that you are a historian, or that you've had any formal graduate education or experience in the field of history. We've had journalists, lawyers, political scientists, and even businessmen assigned to these detachments. Remember also that MHDs are designed to collect data. These detachments do very little writing.

**Wilson:** Given the range of background for these personnel, it certainly suggests that recruiting specific individuals for specific tasks or assignments would be the desired course of action.

**Davis:** Yes, and we're starting to do this. We've also asked for more active duty military history detachments.

**Lewis:** This is a topic that we've addressed in previous meetings. Obviously, we need more detachments that are staffed by better qualified individuals.

**Sumida:** Yes, but we can also add the need for more augmentations—specific individuals in specific assignments. MHDs, I think, are going to be more critical in the immediate future, especially in collecting the data for the official histories that will follow.

**Bowman:** I found that some history detachments were stymied by the Rand Corporation initiative. You see, Rand ate time from units. They would collect this data from the units, which required considerable investments of time and sometimes personnel to support these contractors. And when the MHD showed up to collect similar material, the units were reluctant to do this again. The duplicate effort resulted in withheld support for the MHD.

[Two general discussions followed: one dealing with the need for more military history detachments and the other highlighting the necessity that an MHD be commanded by a field grade officer. (Colonels and lieutenant colonels had easier access to headquarters personnel and records and a higher level of experience and comprehension of the material they were dealing with.) The principal participants in these discussions included: **Clarke, Sumida, Pennington, Bowman, Dalessandro, and Linn.**]

**Sumida:** What do the MHDs do, or rather, what are they doing now?

**Davis:** Collecting and interviews are their primary tasks right now.

[There were multiple conversations about archives, interviews and transcripts, and access to MHD products.]

**Stewart:** These discussions are blending into our last item on today's agenda concerning our current military operations and CMH publications. We have several

different studies going on right now: a history of the first Stryker brigade in Iraq; a series of interviews with commanders from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM; another OEF pamphlet that will pick-up where our last one left off; selected readings from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (this will be comparable to the Vietnam study *Seven Firefights*); and a history of modularity since 1993. I know that our friends at Fort Leavenworth are engaged in similar activities as well.

**Robertson:** Two of our six divisions in CSI are devoted to OIF and OEF. The Combined Arms Center is assisting Fort Riley in training advisors for Iraq. So we're providing historical perspectives to aid in their efforts.

**Clarke:** Is the DAHAC on the distribution list for your publications?

**Robertson:** Not yet, but we'll fix that when I get back to Leavenworth.

**Sumida:** I think we must be careful not to stress only our success stories.

**Robertson:** We don't do that—and never would. As an example, we are preparing a short monograph similar to the Vietnam era *Seven Firefights*. We've got a non-combat book in the works too. So we're not all success stories. We have some controversial topics that are pending: troop numbers in Iraq, treatment of detainees and prisoners, and various combat operations.

**Sumida:** This is encouraging.

**Carafano:** This sounds good, but is there a plan to articulate what these products are to be used for and who the intended audience is supposed to be? What's the plan for how all this material is to be utilized?

**Stewart:** Well, we have pinpoint distribution, but we don't have a systematic evaluation process.

**Carafano:** If we're creating publications on current military operations, are we hitting the desired audience with the information they need or want?

**Pennington:** How would we do that? The only thing that comes to my mind is a reader response card.

[A general discussion followed about the utility and marketing of historical publications produced by CMH and CSI. The consensus appeared to be that there was no feedback mechanism and no marketing effort. This was a problem that was recognized ten years ago, but defied any solution then or since. All agreed that publications should not be created for which there is no interest or value, but several specific examples were cited in which historical publications from CMH and CSI were used for training and operational planning. The principal participants included: **Wilson, Clarke, Carafano, Robertson, and Sumida.**]

The meeting recessed at 3:33 p.m., and a reception in honor of the DAHAC followed.



27 October 2006

The DAHAC Chairman's meeting began at 8:20 a.m. in the conference room of the Center of Military History. In attendance during all or part of the meeting were the following personnel:

**Dr. Richard W. Stewart**, Chief Historian, Center of Military History (Executive Secretary, DAHAC)

**Professor Jon T. Sumida**, University of Maryland, College Park (DAHAC, Chairman)

**Professor Adrian R. Lewis**, University of North Texas (DAHAC)

**Professor Brian M. Linn**, Texas A&M University (DAHAC)

**Professor Ronald H. Spector**, George Washington University (DAHAC)

**Professor Reina Pennington**, Norwich University

**Dr. James J. Carafano**, The Heritage Foundation (DAHAC)

**Professor Theodore A. Wilson**, University of Kansas (DAHAC)

**COL Lance Betros** (representing BG Patrick Finnegan, U.S. Military Academy), Department of History (DAHAC)

**COL Robert Dalessandro** (representing COL Thomas Torrance, Army War College), Army Heritage and Education Center (DAHAC)

**Mr. Steven A. Raho** (representing Ms. Joyce Morrow, Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army), Records Management and Declassification Agency (DAHAC)

**Dr. William G. Robertson**, U.S. Army Combat Studies, TRADOC

**Dr. James H. Willbanks** (representing BG Mark O'Neill, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College), Department of Military History, CGSC

**Dr. J. Britt McCarley** (representing LTG Thomas Metz, TRADOC), U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (DAHAC)

**Mr. R. Cody Phillips**, Staff Curator, Center of Military History (Recorder, DAHAC)

**Dr. John Shortal**, Assistant Chief of Military History, Center of Military History

**COL John Spinelli**, Deputy Director, Center of Military History

**Betros:** [The meeting already was in progress, with COL Betros summarizing the history programs at the U.S. Military Academy. See Tab K.]

The DAHAC recessed at 8:30 a.m. for a group photograph, and resumed its deliberations at 8:41 a.m.

**Willbanks:** [Summarized activities of the Military History Department at the Command and General Staff College, stressing the imminent construction of a new building, a new historian fellowship, and an increase in history instruction for classes by four hours.]

**Sumida:** Let's revisit a few things that already have been raised. I'd like to begin with some things we were discussing earlier about contemporary military operations. CSI seems to be doing a lot with tactics, but I wonder if maybe the scope shouldn't be broadened to embrace operations and strategy as well?

**Robertson:** I'd like to point out that there are some limitations about focusing our research and writing on strategy and operational art. The Strategic Studies Institute does that. It's their job. We're not against doing those topics (and we're happy to engage in them), but our prime mission is tactics and operations.

**Wilson:** Maybe it would be useful for the DAHAC to comment on the need to study introspectively the current operational environment. Let's not repeat what happened in the 1970s with Vietnam. Back then, we essentially said, "Oh, we don't ever want to repeat that experience." So we ignored the topic altogether.

**Carafano:** I agree. Nothing could be worse for the study of military history. We need to strengthen the links between academia and historical study.

**Spector:** We tried that with the post-Vietnam period, but the universities were not interested and the Army wasn't pushing very hard either. I think it will be even more difficult this time around.

**Linn:** The material that CSI is producing now is quite useful and timely. Our problem, however, is that the history of OIF is being written by journalists—not historians. We're moving too slow. For example, Andy Birtle's book should have been published three years ago. Long delays like this are likely to produce material that is no longer useful when the publication finally becomes available.

**Wilson:** I'm not sure what the delays might be, but an interim solution to this dilemma may be the conferences that CSI recently have sponsored. They're non-classified, but informative and timely. CMH used to do this. What happened?

**Stewart:** Our funds were cut. Everything was in place—literally everything. And then 30 days out, the Army had significant funding shortfalls and we had to make some cuts. The conference was one of the casualties.

**Sumida:** Why not make conferences a high visibility solution to the study of current military operations?

[There was a general discussion about the importance of historical conferences. This led to comments about hiring difficulties outside the federal government and the need for adequate funding to accomplish missions. The consensus was that in the long-run professional conferences were an inexpensive means of ensuring sound historical study and meaningful interaction with non-Army historians. The principal participants included: **Linn, Carafano, and Dalessandro.**]

**Stewart:** I think that too late the Army will realize that it has not invested sufficient resources to sustain its historical program. And then we are going to experience the same scenario that has affected the records management folks.

**Unknown:** It's already happening.

**Unknown:** We're behind the power-curve already.

**Robertson:** Well, let's face it: our growth recently has come from contractors. We look good now, and we get the job done. But when the money disappears, so will the contractors. And then we'll be right where we were when CSI started up 25 years ago. The future is uncertain.



**Sumida:** My argument is that there is no short-term fix. There is a need for long-term investment with resources to sustain and develop historical programs throughout the Army.

[There was a general discussion concerning anticipated organizational reductions and the probable affect on history offices. The principal participants included: **McCarley**, **Robertson**, and **Dalessandro**.]

**Wilson:** This is an investment in the Army's future. The very modest cost of the Army's historical program will yield tremendous benefits in the long-term.

**Linn:** It's also good public relations. If we don't engage the civilian community, you shouldn't be surprised how civilian academics respond to and interpret Army history.

[Another general discussion followed discussing the strengths and weaknesses of utilizing contract and permanent full-time historians. The over-riding concern was a trend to "dis-invest" in the historical community: "you can't buy the program off the shelf." The principal participants in this discussion included: **Stewart**, **Sumida**, **Wilson**, and **Carafano**.]

**Willbanks:** Actually, it may be worse than you think. The focus these days is on experiential learning. Soldiers are grabbing short-term gains, such as a plum command or staff assignment, instead of formal schooling (which is a long-term investment. So we're being hit from both sides: bean counters trying to push the numbers and funds down, while Army personnel pursue experience over education. It's a dangerous mix in the military.

**Lewis:** Let's remember that the Army isn't driving this train. It's a DOD driver. This is all part of a bigger picture.

**Carafano:** But the Army doesn't have to fold either.

[There was a free-ranging discussion among several participants. One group (**Linn**, **Carafano**, **McCarley**, and **Sumida**) felt that small investments in historical programs through the use of contractors would help sustain these operations. And they concluded that a citation in the DAHAC report encouraging a strengthening of field history programs, especially in the branch schools, would help. A second group (**Pennington**, **Lewis**, and **Spector**) raised the question about surveying Army schools to determine what military history is actually being taught and studied.]

**Linn:** Mac Coffman did a survey many years ago to determine what military history courses were being offered in universities. I think SMH [Society of Military Historians] has done something more recently.

**McCarley:** Cadet Command did something like that and surveyed what was being done at schools that had ROTC detachments.

**Sumida:** Well, the immediate problem is what I should say to the DAS.

**McCarley:** The field program: we need your support. Positive encouragement and continued support to sustain what we have and are doing: we need that much.

**Linn:** We want to be sure to give CMH high marks too.

**Betros:** On the positive side, there is a clear Army commitment to support graduate education for officers. This is a far cry above what was done years ago. In fact, the Army is leading the way in this arena.

**Sumida:** It's the gold standard within DOD. No one else—none of the other services—does this as well as or as extensively as the Army.

**Spector:** Well, going from the cosmic to the micro, I'd like to bring up something that I recently heard. There is a rumor floating around that CMH is considering closing its library. If true, I think this would be a bad idea.

**Stewart:** No. That's not the case. That rumor started because the AA [Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army] launched an inquiry about what we have libraries for. They were looking at obvious duplication and redundancies. That does not exist here. Nonetheless, we had to answer the questions and go through the drill. Closure of our library is not an option. It won't happen.

[There was a general discussion about other Army libraries and their consolidation and closure at other installations. The principal participants in this discussion included: **Raho, Dalessandro, Stewart, and McCarley.**]

**Lewis:** I mentioned this at previous meetings, but I want to highlight it again. I think we ought to be coordinating our efforts with the other services. I've seen the Navy addressing the same issues as the Army faces—and going in the opposite direction. We talk about lowering the number of hours in instruction at Army schools; the Navy is looking at increasing the number hours of instruction. That's just an example. I think we ought to be talking to each other. We may have a lot to share.

[This prompted another general discussion about the deficiencies of naval instruction, particularly in preparing its personnel for senior level staff positions. The consensus was that Army officers can do better staff planning because the Army has CGSC and there is no Navy equivalent. The participants in the discussion included **Lewis, Willbanks, and Sumida.**]

The annual meeting of the DAHAC concluded at 9:51 a.m. on 27 October 2006.

**I certify that I have read these annotated proceedings and that they are an accurate summary of the deliberations of the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee (DAHAC) meeting 27-28 October 2005.**



Jon T. Sumida  
Chairman, DAHAC

14 December 2006  
date